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Abstract— Internet search results are a growing and highly
profitable advertising platform. Search providers auction adver-
tising slots to advertisers on their search result pages. Due to
the high volume of searches and the users’ low tolerance for
search result latency, it is imperative to resolve these auctions
fast. Current approaches restrict the expressiveness of bids in
order to achieve fast winner determination, which is the problem
of allocating slots to advertisers so as to maximize the expected
revenue given the advertisers’ bids. The goal of our work is
to permit more expressive bidding, thus allowing advertisers to
achieve complex advertising goals, while still providing fast and
scalable techniques for winner determination.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the huge number of Internet searches performed every
day, search result pages have become a thriving advertising
platform. The results of a search query are presented to the
user as a web page that contains a limited number of slots,
typically between four and twenty, for advertisements. On
each search result page, major search engines, like Google and
Yahoo, sell these slots to advertisers via an auction mechanism
that charges an advertiser only if a user clicks on his ad. Most
of Google’s multi-billion dollar revenue, and more than half of
Yahoo’s revenue, comes from these so-called sponsored search
auctions [1]; and this market is growing quickly. By 2008,
spending by US firms on sponsored search is expected increase
by $3.2 billion from 2006 and will exceed $9.6 billion, the
amount spent on all of online advertising in 2004 [2]. With
the increasing market size in mind, it is natural to approach
sponsored search auctions from a database perspective in order
to tackle issues of scalability and expressiveness. Our paper is
a first step in this direction.
Sponsored search auctions currently work as follows:
1) Bid submission. Advertisers submit bids on clicks for
certain keywords offline.
2) User search. A user submits a search query.
3) Winner determination. Slots are assigned to advertisers
by the search provider based on the advertisers’ bids.
4) User action. The search result page is returned to the
user who may now click on one or more of the sponsored
links.
5) Pricing and payment. The search provider charges an
advertiser according to some pricing rule if the user
clicked on the advertiser’s sponsored link.
The speed of the winner determination in Step 3 is crucial
because it contributes to the user-experienced latency since the
winning ads are displayed on the search result page returned
to the user. In current sponsored search auctions, this winner
determination can be done quickly because advertisers are
limited to submitting a single bid on whether or not the user
clicks on their ad.
A. The Need for Expressive Auctions
Unfortunately, as we now point out, the limited bidding
in current sponsored search auctions is insufficient to meet
advertisers’ needs in two respects.
Bidding on Multiple Features. Once the advertisers’ ads
are displayed on the search results page, the user who sub-
mitted the query may click on the ad and may even make
a purchase as a result. Advertisers clearly value purchases
because they represent immediate revenue. They also value
clicks on their ads because they indicate potential customers.
However, even if the user does not click on or buy something,
advertisers might place value on having their ads displayed
simply because this increases their chance to make an impres-
sion on the customer. Advertisers who value brand awareness
may wish their ads to be placed in prominent positions. Such
advertisers may prefer their ads to be displayed near the top
or bottom of the list, but not in the middle. Other advertisers
whose goals are to be perceived as the leaders in their markets
may wish their ads to be displayed in the topmost slot or not
displayed at all. Thus it is clear that advertisers have valuations
on clicks, purchases, and slot positions.
Unfortunately, in current search advertising platforms, ad-
vertisers are restricted to bidding only on whether they receive
a click on their ad. We call this a single-feature auction since
the advertisers can express their valuations on only one feature,
namely, receiving a click. Our goal is to support multi-feature
auctions that would allow advertisers to express valuations on
multiple features, namely, clicks, purchases, and slot positions.
Extending bidding to multiple features is non-trivial; whereas
previously the advertiser submitted a single value as depicted
in Figure 1, now the advertiser can submit a whole table of
values for the different combinations of features, as depicted
in Figure 2. The fast algorithms for winner determination that
are currently used by Google and Yahoo! do not extend to
non-trivial multi-feature auctions. Moreover, even for single-
feature auctions, these algorithms can correctly deal with only
a restricted situation, namely, one where the expected number
of clicks on an ad is “separable” into the product of an
advertiser-specific factor and a slot-specific factor.
Dynamic Bidding Strategies. The language that search
providers, such as Google and Yahoo, currently use to let
advertisers express bidding preferences in is rather limited.
While the language does allow advertisers to specify a limited
number of parameters to constrain their bids (such as a
daily budget, and geographic targets), the language is often
insufficiently expressive for serious advertisers to express their
preferences and how they change over time. To deal with
this, advertisers employ the services of various third-party
search engine management companies (such as iProspect,
SureHits, Atlas, etc.) that monitor the outcomes of auctions
and periodically resubmit bids on behalf of the advertiser
in an attempt to approximate the advertisers’ preferences
as much as possible. The kinds of goals that they try to
achieve include maintaining a specified slot position during
certain hours of the day, maintaining a slot position above a
specified competitor, and equalizing the return on investment
(ROI) across multiple keywords.The success of such search
engine management companies demonstrates the desire among
advertisers for more complex expressive bidding in search
auctions. Again, advertisers want these, but can only pick from
a set of pre-defined strategies that these companies provide.
B. Our Framework
With the increasing market size in mind, our goal is to
design a framework that allows huge numbers of advertisers
to bid on a richer set of features using dynamic bidding
strategies while simultaneously allowing the search provider
to determine winners quickly so as not to detract from the user
experience [3].
Bidding Language. In this paper, we propose a simple but
rich language for bidding that allows advertisers to express
their high-level strategies directly; we allow users to submit
their dynamic strategies as bidding programs that can bid on
multiple features of the auction outcome, such as purchases
and slot positions, in addition to clicks. Programs take as input
the search query and various statistics about auction history
and performance, and they output bids on clicks, purchases,
and slot positions. Using this language gives advertisers direct
and fine-grained control over their advertising strategies in-
stead of simply picking from a menu of pre-defined goals, as
is currently done. Thus, in our framework, the search auctions
work as follows:
1) Program submission. Advertisers submit a bidding
program to bid on their behalf.
2) User search.
3) Program evaluation. The programs are run and place
bids on clicks, purchases, and slot positions.
4) Winner determination.
5) User action.
6) Pricing and payment.
Scalable Algorithms. We provide an algorithm for winner
determination that takes as input bids made in our expressive
bidding language and runs quickly provided that the bids
satisfy a condition that can be viewed as a generalization of
separability; moreover, we prove that this requirement is in a
sense necessary to get fast performance.
We also provide techniques for reducing the amount of work
that needs to be done when evaluating dynamic strategies of
many advertisers. This results in a scalable infrastructure for
multi-feature auctions with dynamic strategies.
Summary of our contributions. We approach sponsored
search auctions from a database perspective, and tackle issues
of scalability and expressiveness. Our main contribution is an
efficient and scalable infrastructure that permits much more
expressive bidding than is currently available. In particular,
we provide
• a language to express dynamic bidding strategies for
multi-feature sponsored search auctions (Section II);
• an efficient, scalable, and parallelizable algorithm to solve
winner determination for bids in our language (Section
III);
• techniques to reduce the amount of work necessary for
evaluating dynamic strategies for multiple advertisers
(Section IV).
We evaluate our techniques experimentally in Section V, and
we conclude in Section VI.
II. BIDDING STRATEGIES AS PROGRAMS
In this section, we formalize the notion of bidding on
multiple features, and we propose a simple language for
dynamic strategies that bid on these features.
A. Multiple Features
Recall that traditionally an advertiser could only bid on
one property of the outcome, namely, whether his ad received
a click. Now we would like to allow advertisers to bid on
additional properties as well, namely whether a purchase was
made, and whether his ad was displayed within a desired set
of slots. To each advertiser, we make available the following
predicates that indicate whether or not the outcome has one
of these desired properties.
1) Slotj , indicating that the advertiser gets slot j, for j ∈
{1, . . . , k}, with k being the number of slots.
2) Click, indicating that the user clicked on the advertiser’s
ad.
3) Purchase, indicating that the user made a purchase via
a link from the advertiser’s ad.
Conceptually, the advertiser associates a value with each
truth assignment to these predicates, as depicted in Figure 2.
However, the size of such a representation is exponential in
the number of predicates. So we represent bids as OR-bids on
Boolean combinations of predicates instead. That is, we let
the advertiser fill in a Bids table where each row corresponds
to a Boolean formula of predicates and the amount that he
is willing to pay should that formula be true. If multiple
formulas are true, the advertiser can be charged the sum of the
Click value
Y 3
Fig. 1. Single-feature valuation
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Fig. 2. Multi-feature valuation
corresponding amounts. For example, the Bids table depicted
in Figure 3 indicates that the advertiser is willing to pay 5
cents if he gets a purchase; 2 cents if his ad is displayed in
either positions 1 or 2; and 7 cents if he gets a purchase and
his ad is displayed in positions 1 or 2.
B. Dynamic Strategies
As we said, we are interested in designing a programming
language that lets advertisers express more complex prefer-
ences, which may change over time. Instead of providing
advertisers with a pre-defined selection of advertising strate-
gies, we let the advertisers submit their bidding strategies as
programs for the search provider to run. Conceptually, each
time a user submits a search query to the search provider,
these programs are triggered. The main purpose of these
programs is to output bids on clicks, purchases, and slot
positions that may result from displaying their ad on the
search result page. In order to do so, each program creates
a Bids table as described in Section II-A each time there is
a sponsored search auction. These programs have access to
several variables pertinent to the current auction and to the
advertiser, such as the keywords in the search query, the time
of day, the advertiser’s remaining budget, the current return on
investment for the keywords that the advertiser is interested in,
and so on. These variables are stored in tables, some of which
are read-only shared between all advertisers (such as the time
and location of the search) and some of which are private
to each advertiser (such as information about the keywords
that the advertiser is interested in). The programs can then be
written using simple SQL updates without recursion and side-
effects. SQL triggers can be used to activate programs when an
auction begins and to notify programs if they received a slot,
click, or purchase. Programs can modify their private tables,
although commonly used variables, such as amount spent,
budget remaining, return on investment for various keywords,
etc. can be automatically maintained for each program by the
search provider. For example, the advertiser-specific variables
related to keywords are stored in a Keyword table, as depicted
in Figure 4 that is private to each advertiser. Each tuple
in the Keyword table corresponds to a bid for a keyword
formula value
Purchase 5
Slot1 ∨ Slot2 2
Fig. 3. Bids table
text formula maxbid roi bid relevance
boot Click ∧ Slot1 5 2 4 0.8
shoe Click 6 1 8 0.2
Fig. 4. Keywords table
that the advertiser is interested. The attributes of the tuple
contain, among other things, the formula for the bid, keyword’s
relevance score in the search query, the return on investment
that this keyword has provided the advertiser, the maximum
amount that the advertiser is willing to bid on a click by a user
who searched for this keyword, and the amount of money that
the advertiser is currently bidding for the keyword. The search
provider updates the return on investment for a keyword each
time a user searches for the keyword and then clicks on the
advertiser’s ad. The bidding program can be stored with its
private tables to improve locality. Since bidding programs use
private tables and read-only shared tables, they do not interact
with each other when they are triggered by a new search query.
Hence they can be distributed across several machines and run
in parallel if necessary.
C. An Example: Equalizing ROI
We now give a concrete example of a dynamic bidding
strategy that bids on multiple features. Our example combines
the dynamic ROI equalizing heuristic mentioned in Section
I with bidding on two features, clicks and the top slot; the
advertiser is interested in receiving clicks for two keywords,
“boot” and “shoe”, but also wants to be perceived as the
leading supplier of boots and so would be willing to pay extra
to be shown in the top slot if the search query is highly relevant
to boots. In order to control his spending, the advertiser has
a target spending rate that he wishes to maintain. The ROI
equalizing heuristic, as suggested in [4], tries to dynamically
allocate spending across the different keywords and bids so
as to maximize the advertiser’s “bang for the buck”. If the
advertiser is underspending (i.e., his current spending rate
is lower than his target spending rate), then the advertiser
increases the bids on keywords that have been most profitable
for him (i.e., those with the highest return on investment). If
the advertiser is overspending (i.e., his current spending rate
is higher than his target spending rate), then the advertiser
decreases the bids on keywords that have been least profitable
for him (i.e., those with the lowest return on investment).
Return on investment of a bid is the total value gained from
the keyword (e.g., number of clicks received in the top slot
times the amount the advertiser values a click in the top slot)
divided by the amount spent so far on it.
Figure 5 shows the program for this strategy. Line 1 creates
a trigger that waits for a new query to be inserted into the
Query table, indicating that a new auction is taking place. If the
1 CREATE TRIGGER bid AFTER INSERT ON Query
2 {
3 IF amtSpent / time < targetSpendRate THEN
4 UPDATE Keywords
5 SET bid = bid + 1
6 WHERE roi =
7 ( SELECT MAX( K.roi )
8 FROM Keywords K )
9 AND relevance > 0
10 AND bid < maxbid;
11 ELSEIF amtSpent / time < targetSpendRate
12 THEN
13 UPDATE Keywords
14 SET bid = bid - 1
15 WHERE roi =
16 ( SELECT MIN( K.roi )
17 FROM Keywords K )
18 AND relevance > 0
19 AND bid > 0;
20 ENDIF;
21
22 UPDATE Bids
23 SET value =
24 ( SELECT SUM( K.bid )
25 FROM Keywords K
26 WHERE K.relevance > 0.7
27 AND K.formula = Bids.formula );
28 }
Fig. 5. Equalize ROI
formula value
Click ∧ Slot1 4
Click 0
Fig. 6. Bids table for Example Program
advertiser notices that he has been underspending (line 3), he
increases his tentative bids for all relevant keywords that have
provided him with the highest ROI, taking care not to increase
the bid past its maximum value (lines 4–10). Similarly, lines
13–19 decreases his bids for relevant keywords with the lowest
ROI if he is overspending (line 11), taking care not to decrease
his bid below zero. Next, he updates the values in the Bids
table with the sum of his tentative bids for the corresponding
formulas for all sufficiently relevant keywords, namely, those
with a relevance score higher than 0.7 in the user-submitted
search query (lines 22–27). For example, if the Keywords table
is as depicted in Figure 4 after running lines 1–20, then the
output Bids table will be as depicted in Figure 6.
III. WINNER DETERMINATION
Having empowered the advertisers with a language for
expressing dynamic bidding strategies to bid on a rich set of
features, we now seek efficient and scalable techniques for the
search provider to perform winner determination.
All sponsored search auction mechanisms currently in use
(see, for example, [5], [6], [1], [7]) first solve the winner-
determination problem, then assign slot positions according to
the winning allocation, and finally use some method of charg-
ing prices for the positions, such as charging each advertiser
their social opportunity cost (this is known as Vickrey pricing
[8], [9], [10]), or charging advertiser in the kth slot the amount
bid by the next-highest bidder (this is known as generalized
second-pricing [1]). Note that with most pricing schemes, a
provider’s revenue is not the revenue that is computed in the
winner-determination problem. Different pricing schemes lead
to different behavior of the auction in terms of revenue, sta-
bility, and other economic and game-theoretic properties. For
example, Vickrey pricing leads to theoretically stable truthful
auctions [10], while generalized second pricing leads to locally
envy-free equilibria [1]. Nevertheless, the first step in all these
auctions is to do winner determination. Furthermore, given
winner determination as a subroutine, the pricing schemes used
in these auctions (i.e., Vickrey pricing, generalized second-
pricing, etc.) can all be expressed as very simple computations.
In our work, therefore, we focus on optimizing the winner-
determination computation.
A. How Winner Determination Works
The winner-determination problem is to compute the al-
location of slots to advertisers that results in the highest
expected revenue for the search engine provider, under the
assumption that advertisers actually pay what they bid. In
keeping with Google and Yahoo policy, we restrict the slot
allocations to those in which no advertiser gets assigned more
than one slot. This prevents extremely wealthy advertisers
from monopolizing all the available slots.
In order to compute the expected revenue resulting from an
allocation, we need the advertisers’ bids on clicks, purchases,
and slot positions as specified in their Bids tables. For now, let
us assume, that we actually run all of the advertisers’ bidding
programs to get their resulting Bids tables. In Section 4, we
give techniques that require us to run only a small subset of
programs under certain conditions.
In order to compute the expected revenue resulting from an
allocation, we also need the probabilities that the formulas in
the Bids tables are true in the final outcome. We thus consider
the set of all possible outcomes that describe which slot was
allocated to which advertiser together with which advertisers
received clicks and purchases. The probabilities of clicks and
purchases depend on the search provider’s allocation of slots to
advertisers. For example, ads placed at the top are more likely
to be noticed and clicked on than those placed in the middle
of the page [11]. As a reasonable first-order approximation,
we assume that the probability that a given advertiser gets a
click depends only on the slot allocated to him, and that the
probability that he gets a purchase depends only on whether
he got a click and on the slot allocated to him. Furthermore,
we assume that the search provider has (or can estimate, using
data it has collected) these click and purchase probabilities for
each advertiser and each slot allocation to that advertiser.
Note that a complete representation of the probabilities of
all possible formulas for each advertiser is exponential in the
number of features. Although this is not too large in our
setting, the complete set of probabilities should be stored in
a database separate from the run-time system, which itself
should store only probabilities for the formulas mentioned in
the bidding programs and Keyword tables, since these are the
only probabilities that are used. Furthermore, the probabilities
can be partitioned by advertiser and should be stored with
the advertiser’s bidding program and private tables to improve
locality.
B. Complexity
Given the assumptions on slot allocations and distributions
above, we look at the complexity of solving the winner-
determination problem given bids in our language. Recall
that a bidding program’s output is an OR-bid represented
by a Bids table whose rows contain bids of the form “Pay
$d1 for E1”, . . . , “Pay $dm for Em”, where E1, . . . , Em
are Boolean combinations of the Slotj , Click, and Purchase
predicates. Recall that, in addition, we assume that for any
allocation, we have a distribution on outcomes, conditional
on that allocation. Each formula Ei can be identified with
an event on the set of possible outcomes, namely, the set
of outcomes in which Ei is true. Thus bidding on formulas
can be interpreted as bidding on events. Toward proving that
winner determination is tractable for bids in our language, we
introduce the following definition.
Definition 1 (m-dependent event): An event is m-
dependent if there are at most m advertisers such that
probability of the event given any allocation depends only on
the placement of those m advertisers.
That is, an event is m-dependent if it is independent of the
slots assigned to all but m advertisers. For example, the event
that a given advertiser gets a click is 1-dependent since we
assumed that the probability of an advertiser getting a click
depends only on the slot position of that advertiser. Similarly,
the event that a given advertiser is in either the top slot or the
bottom slot is 1-dependent since it depends only on the slot
assigned to that advertiser. However, given two advertisers, the
event that one gets the top position and the second gets the
bottom is 2-dependent since it depends on the slots assigned
to both those advertisers.
We assume that the representation of each m-dependent
event includes the labels of the m advertisers on whose slot
assignment the event depends. The following theorem says that
winner determination is tractable for 1-dependent events.1
Theorem 2: For OR-bids on collections of 1-dependent
events, the winner determination problem is in polynomial
time.
It follows that winner determination for bids represented
by a Bids table can be solved in polynomial time, since
our assumptions in Section III-A guarantee that any Boolean
combination of predicates for an advertiser (i.e., of the form
Slot1, . . . , Slotk,Click,Purchase) is 1-dependent.
A natural question to ask is whether we can extend our
tractability results to a language that allows advertisers to bid
on m-dependent events, for m ≥ 2. The next result says
that winner determination is APX-hard if we allow bids to
1See the Appendix for proofs.
be placed on 2-dependent events, such as the event that one
advertiser is displayed above another. APX is the class of
NP optimization problems that have polynomial-time constant-
factor approximation algorithms [12].
Theorem 3: For OR-bids on collections of 2-dependent
events, the winner-determination problem is APX-hard.
In the remainder of this section, we take the reader on
a quest for an efficient and scalable winner-determination
algorithm for our bidding language.
C. Existing Allocation Algorithms
The allocation algorithms used by Google and Yahoo, as
well as those studied in the literature [6], [5], [1], [7], deal
with the issue of scalability by assuming that the probability
of a click resulting from assigning a slot to an advertiser
is separable, that is, it can be written as the product of an
advertiser-specific factor and a slot-specific factor. To illustrate
this notion of separability, we provide examples of non-
separable and separable click probabilities in Figures 7 and 8
respectively. The matrix in Figure 8 is separable because the
entries in the matrix can be split into the product of advertiser-
specific factors (namely, 4 for Nike and 3 for Adidas) and slot
specific-factors (namely, 0.2 for slot 1, and 0.1 for slot 2).
Slot1 Slot2
Nike 0.7 0.4
Adidas 0.6 0.3
Fig. 7. Non-separable click probabilities
Slot1 Slot2
Nike 0.8 0.4
Adidas 0.6 0.3
Fig. 8. Separable click probabilities
When the click probabilities are separable, it is easy to see
that winner determination can be performed by assigning the
advertisers with jth highest advertiser-specific factor to the
slot with the jth highest slot-specific factor. This can be done
in time O(n log k).
Note that the assumption of separability implicitly assumes
that the event that an advertiser gets a click is 1-dependent.
Indeed, it assumes the event that an advertiser gets a click
depends on only that advertiser’s slot assignment. But separa-
bility requires much more 1-dependence: it requires that the
ratio of the expected number of clicks on one advertiser in a
slot and the expected number of clicks on another advertiser
in the same slot is the same for all slots.
Not only is separability a much stronger requirement than
1-dependence, but the techniques for fast winner determination
that use this assumption do not suffice to deal with our bidding
language. In particular, they cannot deal with the situations
described in Section I where one advertiser wants to be
displayed in the top slot or not displayed at all, while another
wants to be displayed in either the top or bottom slots but not
in the middle slots. (Bids representing these preferences can
be easily expressed in our language.)
D. Maximum-Weight Bipartite Matching
We proved Theorem 2 by showing that winner determina-
tion in this case is equivalent to maximum-weight bipartite
matching between advertisers and slots, where the edge-weight
between an advertiser and a slot is the expected revenue
obtained by assigning that slot to that advertiser. The fastest
known (non-parallel) algorithm to solve this is the Hungarian
algorithm, invented by Kuhn [13] (also known as the Kuhn-
Munkres algorithm after being revised by Munkres [14]); it
finds the best matching in time O(nk(n+ k)) where n is the
number of advertisers and k is the number of slots. Since this
is quadratic in n, this will not scale well. We want to deal
with situations where n can be quite large (possibly in tens
to hundreds of thousands). To make the problem scalable, we
need it to be linear in n, the number of advertisers. There are
parallel algorithms for maximum-weight matching [15], but
these require prohibitively large numbers (typically Ω(n2)) of
processing units in order to achieve linear running time.
E. Our Algorithm
We now give a scalable winner-determination algorithm that
takes advantage of the fact that k, the number of slots, is
quite small (say less than 20) compared to n, the number of
advertisers. Indeed, n is growing rapidly every year while k
remains the same. We can modify the Hungarian algorithm to
get a O(nk log k + k5) algorithm by considering only those
advertisers whose values are in the top k highest for some
slot. That is, for each slot, we consider the k advertisers
who would produce the top k expected revenue if placed in
that slot. We take the union of these advertisers over all the
k slots, and consider the bipartite subgraph containing only
these advertisers along with all the k slots. We then solve
maximum-weight bipartite matching problem for this reduced
bipartite graph. As an example, consider the expected revenue
matrix as depicted in Figure 9. There are two slot positions
available and four advertisers. The top two expected revenues
for the first slot come from Nike and Adidas, while the top
two expected revenues for the second slot come from Adidas
and Reebok. The corresponding edges in the original bipartite
graph between advertisers and slots have been depicted in bold
in Figure 10. This bipartite graph is then reduced to contain
only those advertisers with an adjacent bold edge as depicted
in Figure 11. We observe that the maximum matching for the
original problem must occur for this smaller problem since if
an maximum matching in the original problem assigned a slot
to an advertiser who was not in the top k highest bidders for
that slot, we can simply reassign that slot to one of these top
k bidders who is not assigned any slot. Note that since there
are only k − 1 other slots, at least one advertiser in the top k
is guaranteed to remain unassigned.
Finding the relevant advertisers takes time O(nk log k)
because, for each slot, we can find the top k bidders for that
slot in time O(k + n log k) by maintaining a priority heap of
size at most k. There are at most k2 such advertisers since in
the worst case we will have a distinct set of k advertisers for
each of the k slots. Hence running the Hungarian algorithm on
the reduced graph takes time O(k5) for a total running time
of O(nk log k + k5) for our algorithm.
Parallelization. Our technique lends itself very well to
parallelization. Note that in our setting there is typically
already a high amount of parallelized infrastructure present
since the bids are collected from advertisers in a distributed
way. We construct k networks of computers each in the form
of a binary tree of height O(log n) with n leaves. We can
compute a maximum matching in time O(k logn + k5) as
follows. For each slot j, we consider the jth binary tree
network, which will ultimately compute the top k bidders for
that slot at the root:
1) The ith leaf node in the jth network starts out with the
expected revenue from assigning slot j to advertiser i.
2) Each internal node gathers the top k bidders (along
with their corresponding bids) from its two children, and
combines them into a single list of top k bidders. This
takes time O(k) for each of the O(log n) levels of the
tree since each level of the tree works in parallel.
3) The root nodes in each of the j-networks take the union
of their lists of bidders and compute the maximum-
weight matching of these bidders with the k slots using
the Hungarian algorithm. This takes time O(k5) since
there are k slots and at most k2 bidders considered.
Note that we can mix sequential processing with parallel
processing by running more than one program sequentially on
each machine, computing the top k bids, and then aggregating
using a tree network as before. If we have a binary tree
network with p nodes, then the total running time becomes
O(n
p
k log k + k log p+ k5).
Finally the O(k5) part of the algorithm (i.e., the part
resulting from running the Hungarian algorithm on the reduced
bipartite graph) can be reduced to O(k2) using a parallel
algorithm, such as in [15]. The number of parallel processing
units required is O(k5), which is independent of n.
F. Beyond 1-dependence
So far, our results have assumed that the probability that an
advertiser receives a click or a purchase depends only on the
slot to which that advertiser was assigned. However, it is easy
to think of situations where this assumption might not be true.
For example, if the slot assigned to an advertiser for a small
company is just below a very large and popular competitor,
then it is likely that the competitor will receive a substantial
portion of user clicks that might otherwise have gone to the
smaller advertiser had the competitor not been present. Thus
the probability of receiving a click (or a purchase) would
depend on who else displays an ad and in what position. In
the worst case, the probability would depend on the entire slot
assignment. The representation of such a general probability
distribution would be quite large (O(knk)), and, conceptually,
winners can be determined by a brute force algorithm that
considers each of the possible
(
n
k
)
k! assignments.
Slot1 Slot2
Nike 9 5
Adidas 8 7
Reebok 7 6
Sketchers 7 4
Fig. 9. Revenue matrix Fig. 10. Bipartite graph Fig. 11. Reduced graph
This would also lead to advertisers to value two assignments
differently even if both assignments may give the advertiser
the same slot. For example, consider two assignments, both
of which assign an advertiser slot 2. However, in the first
assignment, slot 1 is given to a very famous company, while in
the second assignment, slot 1 is given to a relatively unknown
company. Then the advertiser in slot 2 would naturally prefer
the second assignment to the first, since the famous company
poses a serious threat to the advertiser in terms of diverting
away clicks. Representing such general valuations would also
require large space (O(knk−1)) in general.
Motivated by these concerns, but keeping in mind that we
cannot store such huge distributions and valuations (since n
can be very large), we propose the following model. For a
given search auction, suppose that the advertisers are classified
into either heavyweights (famous advertisers) or lightweights
(relatively unknown advertisers).2 We now allow the prob-
ability that a given advertiser gets a click (or a purchase)
to depend on his slot position as well as on which slots
have heavyweight advertisers and which slots have lightweight
advertisers. We also allow advertisers to place bids on which
slots get heavyweights and which slots get lightweights, in
addition to placing bids on click, purchases, and slot positions
as before. Thus an advertiser might bid 3 cents if he gets slot
2 and if there is a lightweight advertiser in slot 1. Advertisers
could even place more complex bids, such as bidding on
having no heavyweights within 3 slot positions above or below
his slot in addition to having no more than 2 heavyweights
appear anywhere else. The representation of the probability
distributions and valuations now become O(k2k−1) which
does not depend on n anymore.
In order to solve the winner-determination problem, we
must find an assignment of slots to advertisers to maximize
expected revenue (assuming advertisers pay what they bid)
given these new valuations and distributions. Suppose we
knew exactly which slots get heavyweight advertisers in
such a revenue maximizing assignment. We call these slots
heavyweight slots, and we call the remaining slots lightweight
slots. Then we can solve the winner-determination problem
by simply solving two disjoint maximum-weighted bipartite
bipartite matching problems: one matching the heavyweight
2One way for the search provider to decide which advertisers are heavy-
weights is to select those advertisers with the most clicks so far.
advertisers to the heavyweight slots, and the other matching
the lightweight advertisers to lightweight slots. And if we do
this for each possible way to choose heavyweight slots, we can
find the assignment that maximizes expected revenue over all
possible assignments. Moreover, the maximum-weight bipar-
tite matching problems for different choices of heavyweight
slots can be solved independently and in parallel. Therefore,
since there are 2k ways to choose heavyweight slots, we
can solve winner determination in time O(2k(n log k + k5))
in series, or in time O(n log k + k5) in parallel using 2k
processing units. Note that the number of parallel processing
units is independent of the number of advertisers n.
IV. REDUCING PROGRAM EVALUATION
We have shown how to solve the winner-determination
program given the bids output by programs. However, getting
these bids for a given search query requires, in the worst case,
running each advertiser’s program for that query. This itself
can be quite expensive. An obvious step toward alleviating this
problem is for search providers to use their proprietary key-
word matching algorithms to prune away advertisers who are
not interested in the search keywords for the current auction.
However, this is not enough if the search query contains a very
popular keyword, such as “music” or “book”, where the set
of interested advertisers can still be large. In this section, we
show that we can further reduce the amount of work by taking
advantage of knowledge of the structure of the advertiser’s
programs. To simplify exposition, we assume that advertisers’
programs output bids on only Click∧Slot1, . . . ,Click∧Slotk.
It is easy to incorporate bids on other formulas since both
Click and Purchase are assumed to be 1-dependent events.
A. Threshold Algorithm
We start by considering a situation where the only difference
between the programs used by different advertisers is in the
values of certain advertiser-specific parameters. More pre-
cisely, for each slot j ∈ [k], suppose that each advertiser’s bids
depends on a set of (numeric) parameters Xj in a monotonic
way. That is, there is a monotonic function fj : Xj → R+
that takes as input a value for each parameter in Xj and
outputs a bid for a click in slot j. We allow some subset
of the parameters Yj to be advertiser-specific: these can vary
from advertiser to advertiser (e.g., the amount that they value
a particular keyword, the amount of budget remaining, etc.).
Suppose further that these parameters Yj are updated only
by programs that win the auction. In Section IV-B, we consider
the case where all programs can update their state; nonetheless,
restricting updates to winning programs is not unreasonable
since most useful advertiser-specific quantities (such as num-
ber of auctions won, amount spent so far, return on investment
for a given keyword, etc.) only change when the advertiser
wins an auction.
The rest of the parameters Zj = Xj\Yj can be thought of as
public global parameters and are the same for all advertisers
(e.g., the keyword scores associated with the user’s search
query, the time and date, the number of times the keywords
in search query have appeared today). A simple example of
such a situation is where advertisers all use the same general
strategy of starting each day by bidding low and then grad-
ually increasing their bids as the end of the day approaches.
However, they might each start with a different amount and
might increase their bids at different rates. Then the starting
amounts and the rate of increase would be advertiser-specific
parameters in Yj , and the time of day would be a global
parameter in Zj .
For each advertiser i and each slot j, we let the edge weight
between advertiser i and slot j be wi,j×fj(yi,j , zj) where wi,j
is the probability of advertiser i getting a click in slot j, and
yi,j ∈ Yj are the values of the advertiser-specific parameters
and zj ∈ Zj are the values of the global parameters. We
previously showed that we can solve the maximum-weight
matching in time O(nk log k + k5). Under the assumptions
above, we can further reduce the O(nk log k) portion that
finds the top k bidders for each slot as follows. For a given
slot j, we also store a list of bidders sorted by wi,j and we
incrementally maintain |Yj | lists of bidders, each sorted by
one of the parameters in Yj . We can then run the threshold
algorithm [16] with these lists as input to find the top k
advertisers with the highest values of wi,j × fj(yi,j , zj). Note
that we do not need to maintain lists for the parameters in Zj
since all advertisers have the same value for these parameters.
Since fj was monotonic, the threshold algorithm is instance
optimal for the class of algorithms that find the advertisers with
the top k values of fj(xi,j) without making “wild guesses”
(i.e., the algorithms must not access an advertiser until that
advertiser is encountered via a sequential scan of one of
the lists). Instance optimality means that, for any input, the
threshold algorithm finds the top k values within a constant
factor of the time it takes the fastest algorithm that avoids
wild guess on that input. Given these top k advertisers for
each slot, we take O(k5) further time to compute the winners
as described in Section III-E. To maintain the sorted lists,
once the k winners have been computed, we update their Yj
parameters and accordingly update their positions in the sorted
lists, which takes O(|Yj |k logn) time.
B. Logical Updates
We now consider the case where all program update their
state, not just the winners. In certain situations, it is possible
to reduce the amount of work done in this case as well.
Consider a situation where many programs update their state
using an operation that maintains their relative bid ordering.
For example, suppose that many bidders are using the ROI
heuristic described in Section II-C, each with possibly dif-
ferent target spending rates and maximum bids. As long as
certain conditions hold (namely, the bid is above zero and the
spending rate is above the target spending rate), the heuristic
will decrement its bid for a given keyword. Thus, if we
can maintain a decrement list—that is, a list of programs,
sorted by their bid, that are currently decrementing their bid
for a given keyword—we can avoid explicitly decrementing
each program’s bid, by instead performing a single logical
decrement in constant time. That is, the decrement list is
associated with a single adjustment variable, initially zero. A
program’s bid is then the sum of the adjustment variable and
the program’s stored bid. So, in order to decrement the bids of
all programs in the list, we simply decrement the adjustment
variable. The sorted order is maintained because all programs
in the list adjust their bids by the same amount.
Of course, the ROI heuristic eventually stops decrementing
the bid and starts to increment it (if the spending rate drops
below the target) or keep it constant (if the bid is zero) instead.
At this point we must move the program to an increment list
or a constant list as appropriate (similar to a decrement list,
except that the adjustment variable respectively increments or
remains constant). At first glance, this would seem to involve
checking checking the conditions for each program at every
auction. However, we observe that such conditions can often
be reduced to waiting for a shared monotonic variable (such as
time, or the number of times a given keyword has occurred) to
reach a critical value. For example, in the ROI heuristic, the
spending rates of losing programs decreases with time since
their amount spent remains constant. We can thus compute
the next “critical” time that a program would have to stop
decrementing and start incrementing assuming it continued to
lose. Similarly, we can compute the number of auctions for
given keyword necessary before its bid would be decremented
to zero and it would have to remain constant at zero. We
maintain a list of triggers for the relevant shared monotonic
variables, sorted by critical value, that when activated move
a bidding program to the appropriate increment, decrement,
or constant list, and insert the appropriate new triggers. This
way, we only do work for programs that win an auction and
for triggers whose critical values have been reached.
V. EXPERIMENTS
To evaluate our fast winner-determination algorithm, we
compare the performance of four methods for solving the
winner-determination problem. The first method (LP) solves
the linear program formulation of the winner-determination
problem. We can prove that this linear program is guaranteed
to have an integer optimum using a theorem of Chva´tal [17],
by showing that the rows of the constraint matrix represent
the maximal cliques of a perfect graph. The second method
(H) uses the Hungarian algorithm in a straightforward way
to compute the maximum-weight bipartite matching in the
bipartite graph with advertisers on the left and slots on the
right, where the weight of an edge from an advertiser to a
slot is the expected revenue from assigning that slot to that
advertiser. The third method (RH) is our winner-determination
technique from Section III-E, which first reduces the bipartite
graph. The fourth method (RHTALU) augments RH with the
techniques for reducing program evaluation from Section IV
using the threshold algorithm together with logical updates
with triggers.
We used 15 slots in all cases. For simplicity, search queries
were generated at a constant rate, each containing one key-
words chosen uniformly at random out of 10 keywords. That
chosen keyword was given a relevance score of 1 for that
query, while other keywords had a relevance score of 0. All
bidders used the ROI heuristic described in Section II-B. For
each keyword, the bidders’ value for a click was generated
uniformly at random between 0 and 50 (subject to each
bidder having at least one non-zero click value). The target
spending rates were chosen uniformly at random between
1 and the bidder’s maximum value over all keywords. The
interval [0.1, 0.9] was partitioned into 15 disjoint intervals,
with the (j + 1)-highest interval associated with slot j. The
probability of a given advertiser getting a click in a given slot
was generated uniformly at random within that slot’s interval.
We used a slight generalization of generalized second-pricing
to charge the advertisers who received clicks.
The entire auction system, including the ROI heuristic, was
implemented in C++. We used the GNU Linear Programming
Kit to solve the linear program via the simplex method.3 We
ran the experiments on an AMD Athlon 64 3800+ processor
with 1GB of RAM.
Figure 12 shows, for each of the four methods, the average
time taken per auction (over 100 auctions) as we increase
the number of bidders. We observed roughly an order of
magnitude improvement of the Hungarian method over naive
linear programming solution, and further order of magnitude
improvement using our reduced bipartite graph technique.
Figure 13 compares the performance of methods RH and
RHTALU in more detail. It plots the average time taken
per auction (over 1000 auctions) as we increase the number
of bidders. We observe that our techniques for reducing
program evaluation from Section IV give a significant further
improvement in performance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our paper is a first step toward applying database principles
to the exciting and important problems arising in advertis-
ing auctions. In this paper, we highlight the need for more
expressive bidding in sponsored search auctions. To address
this, we propose a framework that empowers advertisers with
an expressive bidding language, and we provide efficient,
scalable, and parallelizable techniques for performing winner
determination given bids expressed in our language.
3We found that the library’s interior point method was much slower than
the simplex method for our workloads.
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We believe that the database community has much to offer
this area given its vast experience with the trade-offs between
expressiveness and scalability; and providing advertisers with
more expressive bidding while retaining the scalability of these
sponsored search auctions is crucial to the continued growth
of this multi-billion dollar industry.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 2: Consider any bid of $d on event E
where E is a 1-dependent event which depends on the slot
assigned to only one advertiser, say i. If advertisers pay what
they bid, then in all outcomes this bid contributes exactly
the same amount to the revenue as the OR-bid of $d on
E ∧ Sloti1, $d on E ∧ Sloti2, . . . , $d on E ∧ Slotik, and $d on
E∧(∧j¬Slot
i
j), where Slot
i
j is the event that advertiser i gets
slot j. This is because Sloti1, . . . , Slot
i
k are mutually exclusive
events since the allocations are restricted to at most one slot
per advertiser. We can thus fill out a table of advertisers
versus slots where the entry for the ith advertiser and the jth
slot is the sum of the total expected revenue from bids on
events of form E ∧ Slotij assuming advertisers pay what they
bid. If we interpret this table as the edge-weight matrix of a
bipartite graph between advertisers and slots, then the winner-
determination problem is the problem of finding a maximum-
weight bipartite matching for this graph, which can be done
in polynomial time [13]. 
Proof of Theorem 3: We reduce the winner-determination
problem to the maximum-weighted feedback arc set problem
by using bids on 2-dependent events to encode the edges
in a given weighted directed graphs on advertisers. Consider
any weighted directed graph on n advertisers. Let wi,i′ be
the weight of the edge from advertiser i to advertiser i′.
Let Slotij be the event that advertiser i gets assigned slot
j. For two advertisers i and i′, let Ei>i′ be shorthand for
∨j(Slot
i
j ∧ ((∨j′>jSlot
i′
j′)∨ (∧j′¬Slot
i′
j′ )), which is the event
that advertiser i gets a slot and is placed above advertiser i′
who may or may not get a slot. Then Ei>i′ is a 2-dependent
event since it depends on the slots assigned to advertisers
i and i′. Let each advertiser i place the following bids: for
each i′ 6= i, bid wi,i′ on Ei>i′ . Then, assuming advertisers
pay what they bid, revenue of wi,i′ will be generated if and
only if advertiser i is placed above advertiser i′. Then winner
determination is equivalent to the problem of finding the
maximum-weighted feedback arc set over all size-k subgraphs,
which is APX-hard in n and k [12]. In fact, even when the
directed graphs are restricted to degree-3, the feedback arc set
problem is still NP-hard [18], [19]. This means that winner
determination is NP-hard even when each bid is restricted
to the events mentioning at most three advertisers. So it is
infeasible to allow advertisers to bid on being placed above
even two or more competitors. 
